Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators

Updated February 29, 2020

Conventional Capacity Strategies

Contingency Capacity Strategies

Crisis Alternate Strategies

Summary of Changes

- Clarification of introductory language
- Information added on Crisis/Alternative Strategies
- Information added to expand upon strategies, including two new resources:
  - Checklist for Healthcare Facilities: Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators during the COVID-19 Response
  - Release of Stockpiled N95 Filtering Facepiece Respirators Beyond the Manufacturer-Designated Shelf Life: Considerations for the COVID-19 Response

Audience: These considerations are intended for use by federal, state, and local public health officials, respiratory protection program managers, occupational health service leaders, infection prevention and control program leaders, and other leaders in healthcare settings who are responsible for developing and implementing policies and procedures for preventing pathogen transmission in healthcare settings.

Purpose: This document offers a series of strategies or options to optimize supplies of disposable N95 filtering facepiece respirators (commonly called “N95 respirators”) in healthcare settings when there is limited supply. It does not address other aspects of pandemic planning; for those, healthcare settings can refer to existing influenza preparedness plans to address other aspects of preparing to respond to novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The strategies are also listed in order of priority and preference in the Checklist for Healthcare Facilities: Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators during the COVID-19 Response in an easy-to-use format for healthcare facilities.

The following strategies are based upon these assumptions: 1) facilities understand their current N95 respirator inventory and supply chain, 2) facilities understand their N95 respirators utilization rate, and 3) facilities are in communication with state and local public health partners (e.g., public health emergency preparedness and response staff) and healthcare coalitions. While these strategies are targeted for optimizing the supply of N95 respirators, some of these strategies may be applicable to optimizing the supply of other personal protective equipment such as gowns, gloves, and eye protection.

Controlling exposures to occupational hazards is a fundamental way to protect personnel. Conventionally, a hierarchy has been used to achieve feasible and effective controls. Multiple control strategies can be implemented concurrently and or sequentially. This hierarchy can be represented as follows:

- Elimination
- Substitution
- Engineering controls
- Administrative controls
- Personal protective equipment (PPE)
To prevent infectious disease transmission, elimination (physically removing the hazard) and substitution (replacing the hazard) are not typically options for the healthcare setting. However, exposures to transmissible respiratory pathogens in healthcare facilities can often be reduced or possibly avoided through engineering and administrative controls and PPE. Prompt detection and effective triage and isolation of potentially infectious patients are essential to prevent unnecessary exposures among patients, healthcare personnel (HCP), and visitors at the facility.

N95 respirators are the PPE most often used to control exposures to infections transmitted via the airborne route, though their effectiveness is highly dependent upon proper fit and use. The optimal way to prevent airborne transmission is to use a combination of interventions from across the hierarchy of controls, not just PPE alone. Applying a combination of controls can provide an additional degree of protection, even if one intervention fails or is not available.

Respirators, when required to protect HCP from airborne contaminants such as infectious agents, must be used in the context of a comprehensive, written respiratory protection program that meets the requirements of OSHA's Respiratory Protection standard. The program should include medical evaluations, training, and fit testing.

Surge capacity refers to the ability to manage a sudden, unexpected increase in patient volume that would otherwise severely challenge or exceed the present capacity of a facility. While there are no commonly accepted measurements or triggers to distinguish surge capacity from daily patient care capacity, surge capacity is a useful framework to approach a decreased supply of N95 respirators during the COVID-19 response. Three general strata have been used to describe surge capacity and can be used to prioritize measures to conserve N95 respirator supplies along the continuum of care.

- **Conventional capacity**: measures consist of providing patient care without any change in daily contemporary practices. This set of measures, consisting of engineering, administrative, and PPE controls should already be implemented in general infection prevention and control plans in healthcare settings.
- **Contingency capacity**: measures may change daily contemporary practices but may not have any significant impact on the care delivered to the patient or the safety of the HCP. These practices may be used temporarily when demands exceed resources.
- **Crisis capacity**: alternate strategies that are not commensurate with contemporary U.S. standards of care. These measures, or a combination of these measures, may need to be considered during periods of expected or known N95 respirator shortages.

Decisions to implement measures in contingency capacity and then crisis capacity should be based on:

- Consideration of all conventional capacity strategies first.
- The availability of N95 respirators and other types of respiratory protection.
- Consultation with entities that include some combination of: local healthcare coalitions, federal, state, or local public health officials, appropriate state agencies that are managing the overall emergency response related to COVID-19, and state crisis standards of care committees. Even when state/local coalitions or public health authorities can shift resources between health care facilities, these strategies may still be necessary.

References

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators: Contingency Capacity Strategies

Contingency Capacity Strategies

In the continuum of care, the following measures can be categorized as contingency capacity, which may change daily practices but may not have any significant impact on the care delivered to the patient or the safety of the HCP. The following measures may be considered in the setting of a potential impending shortage of N95 respirators. The decision to implement these practices should be made on a case by case basis taking into account known characteristics of the SARS-CoV-2 and local conditions (e.g., number of disposable N95 respirators available, current respirator usage rate, success of other respirator conservation strategies, etc.).

Administrative Controls

Decrease length of hospital stay for medically stable patients with COVID-19

Currently, CDC recommends discharge of patients with confirmed COVID-19 when they are medically stable and have an appropriate home environment to which to return. CDC lists considerations for care at home in: Interim Guidance for Implementing Home Care of People Not Requiring Hospitalization for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). If patients cannot be discharged to home for social rather than medical reasons, public health officials might need to identify alternative non-hospital housing where those patients can convalesce.

Personal Protective Equipment and Respiratory Protection

Use of N95 respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life for training and fit testing

In times of shortage, consideration can be made to use N95 respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life. However, expired respirators might not perform to the requirements for which they were certified. Over time, components such as the strap and material may degrade, which can affect the quality of the fit and seal. Because of this, use of expired respirators could be prioritized for situations where HCP are NOT exposed to pathogens, such as training and fit testing. As expired respirators can still serve an important purpose, healthcare facilities should retain all N95 respirators during the early phases of this outbreak.

Extended use of N95 respirators

Practices allowing extended use of N95 respirators, when acceptable, can also be considered. The decision to implement policies that permit extended use of N95 respirators should be made by the professionals who manage the institution’s respiratory protection program, in consultation with their occupational health and infection control departments with input from the state/local public health departments. CDC has recommended guidance on implementation of extended use of N95 respirators in healthcare settings. Extended use has been recommended and widely used as an option for conserving respirators during previous respiratory pathogen outbreaks and pandemics.

Extended use refers to the practice of wearing the same N95 respirator for repeated close contact encounters with several different patients, without removing the respirator between patient encounters. Extended use is well suited to situations wherein multiple patients with the same infectious disease diagnosis, whose care requires use of a respirator, are cohorted (e.g., housed on the same hospital unit). It can also be considered to be used for care of patients with tuberculosis, varicella, and measles.
Limited re-use of N95 respirators for tuberculosis

Re-use refers to the practice of using the same N95 respirator by one HCP for multiple encounters with different patients but removing it (i.e. donning) after each encounter. This practice is often referred to as “limited reuse” because restrictions are in place to limit the number of times the same respirator is reused. It is important to consult with the respirator manufacturer regarding the maximum number of donnings or uses they recommend for the N95 respirator model. If no manufacturer guidance is available, data suggests limiting the number of reuses to no more than five uses per device to ensure an adequate safety margin. N95 and other disposable respirators should not be shared by multiple HCP. CDC has recommended guidance on implementation of limited re-use of N95 respirators in healthcare settings.

For pathogens for which contact transmission is not a concern, routine limited reuse of single-use disposable respirators has been practiced for decades. For example, for tuberculosis prevention, a respirator classified as disposable can be reused by the same provider as long as the respirator maintains its structural and functional integrity. To extend the supply of N95 respirators during an anticipated dwindling supply, HCP could be encouraged to reuse their N95 respirators when caring for patients with tuberculosis disease.

To maintain the integrity of the respirator, it is important for HCP to hang used respirators in a designated storage area or keep them in a clean, breathable container such as a paper bag between uses. It is not recommended to modify the N95 respirator by placing any material within the respirator or over the respirator. Modification may negatively affect the performance of the respirator and could void the NIOSH approval.

References

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators: Conventional Capacity Strategies

Conventional Capacity Strategies

In the continuum of care, the following measures can be categorized as conventional capacity, which consists of providing patient care without any change in daily practices. This set of controls should already be implemented in general infection prevention and control plans in healthcare settings.

Engineering Controls

Engineering controls reduce exposures for HCP by placing a barrier between the hazard and the HCP. Engineering controls can be very effective as part of a suite of strategies to protect HCP without placing primary responsibility of implementation on them (i.e., they function without HCP having to take an action).

- Isolation in airborne infection isolation room

Patients with known or suspected COVID-19 (i.e., person under investigation [PUI]) should be placed in an airborne infection isolation room (AIIR) that has been constructed and maintained in accordance with current guidelines, as recommended in the Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) or Persons Under Investigation for COVID-19 in Healthcare Settings.

- Use of physical barriers

Barriers such as glass/plastic windows can be an effective solution for reducing exposures among HCP to potentially infectious patients. This approach can be effective in reception areas (e.g., intake desk at emergency department, triage station, information booth, pharmacy drop-off/pick-up windows) where patients may first report upon arrival to a healthcare facility. Other examples include the use of curtains between patients in shared areas and closed suctioning systems for airway suctioning for intubated patients.

- Properly maintained ventilation systems

Another cornerstone of engineering controls are ventilation systems that provide air movement from a clean (HCP workstation or area) to contaminated (sick patient) flow direction (along with appropriate filtration, exchange rate) that are installed and properly maintained.

Administrative Controls

Administrative controls are employer-dictated work practices and policies that reduce or prevent hazardous exposures. Their effectiveness depends on employer commitment and HCP acceptance and consistent use of the strategies. Regular training, monitoring and reinforcement are necessary to ensure that policies and procedures are followed consistently. Many of these strategies should already be incorporated into existing infection prevention and control policies in healthcare settings.

Strategies should already be incorporated into existing infection prevention and control policies in healthcare settings.

Limit number of patients going to hospital or outpatient settings

Consider developing mechanisms to screen patients for acute respiratory illness prior to their non-urgent care or elective visits or procedures, such as through the appointment reminder system. Postpone and reschedule those with signs and symptoms presenting for these non-acute visits.

Exclude all HCP not directly involved in patient care

Current CDC guidance recommends that, for COVID-19, only essential personnel enter the patient care area, and that facilities consider caring for these patients with dedicated HCP. Further limiting the numbers of healthcare personnel and patient contacts to those that are medically essential (e.g., excluding dietary personnel, environmental services) could limit the number of respirators used. The medically essential personnel would assume food delivery and environmental services.

Limit face-to-face HCP encounters with patient

Measures can be explored to limit face-to-face contact encounters between HCP and patients with confirmed or suspected COVID-19. HCP may consider bundling care activities to minimize room entries, and bundling may occur across HCP types (e.g., food trays are delivered by HCP performing other care). Alternative mechanisms for HCP and patient interactions include telephones, video monitoring, and video-call applications on cell phones or tablets.

Exclude visitors to patients with known or suspected COVID-19

Restrict visitors from entering the rooms of patients with known COVID-19 or suspected (PUI) COVID-19, as recommended in CDC's guidance. Alternative mechanisms for patient and visitor interactions, such as video-call applications on cell phones or tablets should be explored. Facilities can consider exceptions based on end-of-life situations or when a visitor is essential for the patient's emotional well-being and care. If visitors must enter the room of a known or suspected COVID-19 patient, facilities should provide instruction, before visitors enter patients' rooms on use of PPE according to current facility policy while in the patient's room.

Source control

Identify and assess patients who may be ill with or who may have been exposed to a person with known COVID-19. Patients with symptoms of suspected COVID-19 or other respiratory infection (e.g., fever, cough) presenting to care should use facemasks for source control until they can be placed in an airborne infection isolation room or a private room. Instructions should include how to use facemasks. Patients with these symptoms should not wear N95 respirators. If these patients need to leave their room for services in other areas of the hospital (e.g., radiology), they should also wear facemasks for source control.

Cohorting patients

Cohorting is the practice of grouping together patients who are infected with the same organism to confine their care to one area and prevent contact with other patients. Cohorts are created based on clinical diagnosis, microbiologic confirmation when available, epidemiology, and mode of transmission of the infectious agent. Cohorting has been used extensively for managing outbreaks of multidrug resistant organisms including MRSA, VRE, MDR-ESBLs, *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*; methicillin-susceptible *Staphylococcus aureus*, RSV, adenovirus.
keratoconjunctivitis, rotavirus, and SARS. When single patient rooms are not available, patients with confirmed COVID-19 may be placed in the same room. Cohorting patients could minimize respirator use when extended wear of respirators is implemented. For more information on cohorting of patients, refer to 2007 Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings.

### Cohorting HCP

Assigning designated teams of HCP to provide care for all patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 could minimize respirator use when extended wear of RPDs is implemented. This strategy can also limit the number of exposed HCP who need to be fit tested.

### Telemedicine

Nurse advice lines and telemedicine can screen and manage patients with suspected COVID-19 without the need for the HCP to use respiratory protection. Promoting the use of these technologies and referral networks can help triage persons to the appropriate level of care, potentially reducing the influx of patients to healthcare facilities seeking evaluation.

### Training on indications for use of N95 respirators

It is important that HCP be trained on indications for use of N95 respirators. The OSHA Respiratory Protection standard requires employers to provide respirator training prior to requiring an employee to use a respirator in the workplace. For example, HCP should use N95 respirators when caring for patients under airborne precautions for infectious diseases including COVID-19, tuberculosis, measles, and varicella. HCP should generally not need to use N95 respirators when caring for patients under droplet precautions for infectious diseases except under certain circumstances (e.g., aerosol-generating procedures for influenza).

### Training on use of N95 respirators

Training employees on the proper use of respirators, including putting on and removing them, limitations on their use, and maintenance is essential for effective use of respiratory protection. HCP should be thoroughly trained before they are fit tested to ensure they are comfortable donning the respirator and know how to conduct a user seal check. HCP should be trained on the respirator they are expecting to use at work.

### Just in Time testing

Just-in-time testing refers to the capacity of healthcare facilities to do larger scale evaluation, training, and fit testing of employees when necessary during a pandemic. Facilities may adopt a plan to use the “just-in-time” method for fit testing, which has been incorporated into pandemic plans for many facilities. For large facilities, it may not be feasible to fit test all employees, especially if their job does not typically place them at risk for exposure to airborne infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. If healthcare facilities are expecting to receive COVID-19 patients, they should begin training and start to plan for fit testing now. It is essential to have HCP trained and fit tested prior to receiving patients.

### Limiting respirators during training

In order to conserve the supply of N95 respirators, healthcare facilities should understand which of their HCP do and do not need to be in a respiratory protection program and thus medically evaluated, trained, and fit tested. If training and fit testing are conducted during two separate steps, it is possible to allow limited re-use of N95 respirators used by individual HCP during both steps. Employees should be fit tested after they are comfortable donning the respirator and have passed a user seal check. Employees should be trained on the respirator they are expecting to use at work. The respirator can be saved and used for fit testing and patient care.

Qualitative fit testing

Respirator fit test methods are classified as either qualitative or quantitative, and there are multiple protocols of each classification that are NIOSH-recommended or meet the requirements of OSHA's Respiratory Protection Standard. A qualitative fit test is a pass/fail test to assess the adequacy of respirator fit that relies on the individual's sensory detection of a test agent. A quantitative fit test numerically measures the effectiveness of the respirator to seal with the wearer's face, without relying on the wearer's voluntary or involuntary response to a test agent. Quantitative fit tests involve adaptation of the respirator to the fit testing equipment, which can involve making holes in the respirator.

Many healthcare systems already use qualitative fit test methods for fit testing HCP. For those using quantitative fit test methods, considerations can be made to use qualitative fit test methods to minimize the destruction of an N95 respirator used in fit testing and allow for the re-use of the same N95 respirator by the HCP. Qualitative fit methods may also allow for rapid fit testing of larger numbers of HCP. Any switch in methods should be assessed to ensure proficiency of the fit testers in carrying out the test.

Personal Protective Equipment and Respiratory Protection

While engineering and administrative controls should be considered first when selecting controls, the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) should also be part of a suite of strategies used to protect personnel. Proper use of respiratory protection by HCP requires a comprehensive program (including medical clearance, training, and fit testing) that complies with OSHA's Respiratory Protection Standard and a high level of HCP involvement and commitment. The program should also include provisions for the cleaning, disinfecting, inspection, repair, and storage of respirators used by workers on the job. Proper storage conditions can maximize shelf life of respirators. The following strategies in this section are traditionally used by some healthcare systems. If not already implemented, these strategies can be considered by healthcare settings in the face of a potential N95 respirator shortage before implementing the contingency strategies that are listed further below.

Surgical N95 respirators

Surgical N95 respirators (sometimes called medical respirators) are recommended only for use by HCP who need protection from both airborne and fluid hazards (e.g., splashes, sprays). These respirators are approved by NIOSH and regulated by the FDA and are not used or needed outside of healthcare settings. In times of shortage, only HCP who are working in a sterile field or who may be exposed to high velocity splashes, sprays, or splatters of blood or body fluids should be provided these respirators. Other HCP can use standard N95 respirators. If surgical N95 respirators are not available, and there is a risk that the worker may be exposed to high velocity splashes, sprays, or splatters of blood or body fluids, then a faceshield should be worn over the standard N95 respirator.

Use of alternatives to N95 respirators

Use alternatives to N95 respirators where feasible. These include other classes of filtering facepiece respirators, elastomeric half-mask and full facepiece air purifying respirators, powered air purifying respirators (PAPRs) where
feasible. All of these alternatives will provide equivalent or higher protection than N95 respirators when properly worn. NIOSH maintains a searchable, online version of the certified equipment list identifying all NIOSH-approved respirators.

NIOSH approves other filtering facepiece respirators that are at least as protective as the N95. These include N99, N100, P95, P99, P100, R95, R99, and R100.

**Elastomeric respirators** are half-facepiece, tight-fitting respirators that are made of synthetic or rubber material permitting them to be repeatedly disinfected, cleaned, and reused. They are equipped with exchangeable filter cartridges. Similar to N95 respirators, elastomeric respirators require annual fit testing. Elastomeric respirators should not be used in surgical settings due to concerns that air coming out of the exhalation valve may contaminate the sterile field.

**PAPRs** are reusable respirators that are typically loose-fitting hoods or helmets. These respirators are battery-powered with blower that pulls air through attached filters or cartridges. The filter is typically a high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter. Loose-fitting PAPRs do not require fit-testing and can be worn by people with facial hair. However, PAPRs should not be used in surgical settings due to concerns that the blower exhaust and exhaled air may contaminate the sterile field.

Facilities using elastomeric respirators and PAPRs should have up to date cleaning/disinfection procedures, which are an essential part of use for protection against infectious agents.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators: Crisis/Alternate Strategies

Crisis/Alternate Strategies

These crisis capacity or alternate strategies accompany and build on the conventional and contingency capacity strategies. The following measures are not commensurate with current U.S. standards of care. However, individual measures or a combination of these measures may need to be considered during periods of expected or known N95 respirator shortages. It is important to consult with entities that include some combination of: local healthcare coalitions, federal, state, or local public health officials, appropriate state agencies that are managing the overall emergency response related to COVID-19, and state crisis standards of care committees. Even when state/local healthcare coalitions or public health authorities can shift resources between health care facilities, these strategies may still be necessary.

When N95 Supplies are Running Low

Personal Protective Equipment and Respiratory Protection

Use of respirators beyond the manufacturer–designated shelf life for healthcare delivery

Consideration can be made to use N95 respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life for care of patients with COVID-19, tuberculosis, measles, and varicella. However, respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life may not perform to the requirements for which they were certified. Over time, components such as the straps and nose bridge material may degrade, which can affect the quality of the fit and seal. Many models found in U.S. stockpiles and stockpiles of healthcare facilities have been found to continue to perform in accordance with NIOSH performance standards. However, fluid resistance and flammability were not assessed. Use of the N95 respirators recommended in Release of Stockpiled N95 Filtering Facepiece Respirators Beyond the Manufacturer-Designated Shelf Life: Considerations for the COVID-19 Response can be considered. It is optimal to use these respirators in the context of a respiratory protection program that includes medical evaluation, training, and fit testing. If used in healthcare delivery, it is particularly important that HCP perform the expected seal check, prior to entering a patient care area. CDC does not recommend using N95s beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life in surgical settings.

Use of respirators approved under standards used in other countries that are similar to NIOSH-approved N95 respirators

Other countries approve respirators for occupational use and approve respirators to these standards. These products are evaluated using some methods similar to those used by NIOSH, and some methods that are different, but are expected to protect HCPs. These respirators are expected to provide protection to workers. Those with equivalent or similar protection to NIOSH-approved respirators may be available to provide respiratory protection to workers exposed to harmful airborne particulate matter. These devices are expected to be suitable alternatives to provide protection during the COVID-19 response when supplies are short. The country, conformity assessment standards, acceptable product classifications, standards and guidance documents, and protection factor determination are provided in alphabetical order. All of these respirators have protection factors of at least 10 in the countries listed below, as outlined in the standards and guidance documents specified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Performance Standard</th>
<th>Acceptable product classifications</th>
<th>Standards/Guidance Documents</th>
<th>Protection Factor ≥ 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Performance Standard</td>
<td>Acceptable product classifications</td>
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<td>Protection Factor ≥ 10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>ABNT/NBR 13698:2011</td>
<td>PFF3, PFF2</td>
<td>Fundacentro CDU 614.894</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>GB 2626-2006</td>
<td>KN 100 KP100, KN95 KP95</td>
<td>GB/T 18664—2002</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>EN 149-2001</td>
<td>FFP3, FFP2</td>
<td>EN 529:2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>KMOEL-2017-64</td>
<td>Special 1st</td>
<td>KOSHA GUIDE H-82-2015</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>NOM-116-2009</td>
<td>N100, P100, R100, N99, P99, R99</td>
<td>NOM-116</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NIOSH Requirements</td>
<td>NIOSH approved 42 CFR 84</td>
<td>N100, P100, R100, N99, P99, R99, N95, P95, R95</td>
<td>OSHA 29CFR1910.134</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Limited re-use of N95 respirators for COVID-19 patients**

Limited re-use of N95 respirators when caring for patients with COVID-19 might become necessary. However, it is unknown what the potential contribution of contact transmission is for SARS-CoV-2, and caution should be used. Re-use should be implemented according to CDC guidance. Re-use has been recommended as an option for conserving respirators during previous respiratory pathogen outbreaks and pandemics. It may also be necessary to re-use N95 respirators when caring for patients with varicella or measles, although contact transmission poses a risk to HCP who implement this practice.

**Use of additional respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life for healthcare delivery**

Use of additional N95 respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life for care of patients with COVID-19, tuberculosis, measles, and varicella can be considered. However, respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life may not perform to the requirements for which they were certified. Over time, components such as the straps and nose bridge material may degrade, which can affect the quality of the fit and seal. Some models have been found NOT to perform in accordance with NIOSH performances standards, and consideration may be given to use these respirators as identified in Release of Stockpiled N95 Filtering Facepiece Respirators Beyond the Manufacturer-Designated Shelf Life: Considerations for the COVID-19 Response. In addition, consideration can be given to use N95 respirators beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life that have not been evaluated by NIOSH. It is optimal to use these respirators in the context of a respiratory protection program that includes medical evaluation, training, and fit testing. It is particularly important that HCP perform the expected seal check, prior to entering a patient care area.

**Prioritize the use of N95 respirators and facemasks by activity type**

The number of infectious particles required to cause an infection (infectious dose) is often uncertain or unknown for respiratory pathogens. Further, there is often uncertainty about the influence of factors such as exposure duration and nature of clinical symptoms on the likelihood of infection transmission from person-to-person. When facemasks must be used by HCP entering a patient care area, source control (i.e. masking of symptomatic patients) and maintaining distance from the patient are particularly important to reduce the risk of transmission.
This prioritization approach to conservation is intended to be used when N95 respirators are so limited that routinely practiced standards of care for all HCP wearing N95 respirators when caring for a COVID-19 patient are no longer possible. N95 respirators beyond their manufacture-designated shelf life, when available, are preferable to use of facemasks. The use of N95s or elastomeric respirators or PAPRs should be prioritized for HCP with the highest potential exposures including being present in the room during aerosol generating procedures performed on symptomatic persons.

Suggested facemask or respirator use, based upon distance from a patient with suspected or known COVID-19 and use of source control*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HCP planned proximity to the case patient during encounter</th>
<th>Facemask or respirator determination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patient masked for entire encounter (i.e., with source control)</td>
<td>Unmasked patient or mask needs to be removed for any period of time during the patient encounter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCP will remain at greater than 6 feet from symptomatic patient</td>
<td>HCP remaining at this distance from the patient should not need to enter the patient care area; if entry required: no facemask or respirator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCP will be within 3 to 6 feet of symptomatic patient</td>
<td>HCP remaining at this distance from the patient should not need to enter the patient care area; if entry required: facemask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCP will be within 3 feet of symptomatic patient, including providing direct patient care</td>
<td>Facemask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCP will be present in the room during aerosol generating procedures performed on symptomatic persons</td>
<td>N95 respirator/ elastomeric /PAPR, based on availability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on availability, organizations may require and/or individuals may voluntarily choose to utilize higher levels of protection

When No Respirators are Left

Administrative Controls

Exclude HCP at higher risk for severe illness from COVID–19 from contact with known or suspected COVID–19 patients

During severe resource limitations, consider excluding HCP who may be at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19, such as those of older age, those with chronic medical conditions, or those who may be pregnant, from caring for patients with confirmed or suspected COVID-19 infection.

Designate convalescent HCP for provision of care to known or suspected COVID–19 patients

It may be possible to designate HCP who have clinically recovered from COVID-19 to preferentially provide care for additional patients with COVID-19. Individuals who have recovered from COVID-19 infection may have developed some protective immunity, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Engineering Controls
Expedient patient isolation rooms for risk-reduction

Portable fan devices with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration that are carefully placed can increase the effective air changes per hour of clean air to the patient room, reducing risk to individuals entering the room without respiratory protection. NIOSH has developed guidance for using portable HEPA filtration systems to create expedient patient isolation rooms. The expedient patient isolation room approach involves establishing a high-ventilation-rate, negative pressure, inner isolation zone that sits within a “clean” larger ventilated zone. In the absence of any remaining supply of N95 respirators, it may be possible to use this technology in conjunction with HCP wearing facemasks.

Ventilated Headboards

NIOSH has developed the ventilated headboard that draws exhaled air from a patient in bed into a HEPA filter, decreasing risk of HCP exposure to patient-generated aerosol. This technology consists of lightweight, sturdy, and adjustable aluminum framing with a retractable plastic canopy. The ventilated headboard can be deployed in combination with HEPA fan/filter units to provide surge isolation capacity within a variety of environments, from traditional patient rooms to triage stations, and emergency medical shelters. In the absence of any remaining supply of N95 respirators, it may be possible to use this technology in conjunction with HCP and/or patients wearing facemasks.

Personal Protective Equipment and Respiratory Protection

HCP use of non-NIOSH approved masks or homemade masks

In settings where N95 respirators are so limited that routinely practiced standards of care for wearing N95 respirators and equivalent or higher level of protection respirators are no longer possible, and surgical masks are not available, as a last resort, it may be necessary for HCP to use masks that have never been evaluated or approved by NIOSH or homemade masks. It may be considered to use these masks for care of patients with COVID-19, tuberculosis, measles, and varicella. However, caution should be exercised when considering this option.1,2

References

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Eye Protection

**Audience:** These considerations are intended for use by federal, state, and local public health officials; leaders in occupational health services and infection prevention and control programs; and other leaders in healthcare settings who are responsible for developing and implementing policies and procedures for preventing pathogen transmission in healthcare settings.

**Purpose:** This document offers a series of strategies or options to optimize supplies of eye protection in healthcare settings when there is limited supply. It does not address other aspects of pandemic planning; for those, healthcare facilities can refer to COVID-19 preparedness plans.

Surge capacity refers to the ability to manage a sudden, unexpected increase in patient volume that would otherwise severely challenge or exceed the present capacity of a facility. While there are no commonly accepted measurements or triggers to distinguish surge capacity from daily patient care capacity, surge capacity is a useful framework to approach a decreased supply of eye protection during the COVID-19 response. Three general strata have been used to describe surge capacity and can be used to prioritize measures to conserve eye protection supplies along the continuum of care.

- **Conventional capacity:** measures consist of providing patient care without any change in daily contemporary practices. This set of measures, consisting of engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment (PPE) controls should already be implemented in general infection prevention and control plans in healthcare settings.
- **Contingency capacity:** measures may change daily standard practices but may not have any significant impact on the care delivered to the patient or the safety of healthcare personnel (HCP). These practices may be used temporarily during periods of expected eye protection shortages.
- **Crisis capacity:** strategies that are not commensurate with U.S. standards of care. These measures, or a combination of these measures, may need to be considered during periods of known eye protection shortages.

The following contingency and crisis strategies are based upon these assumptions:

1. Facilities understand their eye protection inventory and supply chain
2. Facilities understand their eye protection utilization rate
3. Facilities are in communication with local healthcare coalitions, federal, state, and local public health partners (e.g., public health emergency preparedness and response staff) regarding identification of additional supplies
4. Facilities have already implemented other engineering and administrative control measures including:
   - Reducing the number of patients going to the hospital or outpatient settings
   - Excluding HCP not essential for patient care from entering their care area
   - Reducing face-to-face HCP encounters with patients
   - Excluding visitors to patients with confirmed or suspected COVID-19
   - Cohorting patients and HCP
   - Maximizing use of telemedicine
5. Facilities have provided HCP with required education and training, including having them demonstrate competency with donning and doffing, with any PPE ensemble that is used to perform job responsibilities, such as provision of patient care

**Conventional Capacity Strategies**

*Use eye protection according to product labeling and local, state, and federal requirements.*

**Contingency Capacity Strategies**

*Selectively cancel elective and non-urgent procedures and appointments for which eye protection is typically used by HCP.*
Shift eye protection supplies from disposable to re-usable devices (i.e., goggles and reusable face shields).

- Consider preferential use of powered air purifying respirators (PAPRs) or full-face elastomeric respirators which have built-in eye protection.
- Ensure appropriate cleaning and disinfection between users if goggles or reusable face shields are used.

Implement extended use of eye protection.

Extended use of eye protection is the practice of wearing the same eye protection for repeated close contact encounters with several different patients, without removing eye protection between patient encounters. Extended use of eye protection can be applied to disposable and reusable devices.

- Eye protection should be removed and reprocessed if it becomes visibly soiled or difficult to see through.
  - If a disposable face shield is reprocessed, it should be dedicated to one HCP and reprocessed whenever it is visibly soiled or removed (e.g., when leaving the isolation area) prior to putting it back on. See protocol for removing and reprocessing eye protection below.
- Eye protection should be discarded if damaged (e.g., face shield can no longer fasten securely to the provider, if visibility is obscured and reprocessing does not restore visibility).
- HCP should take care not to touch their eye protection. If they touch or adjust their eye protection they must immediately perform hand hygiene.
- HCP should leave patient care area if they need to remove their eye protection. See protocol for removing and reprocessing eye protection below.

Crisis Capacity Strategies

Cancel all elective and non-urgent procedures and appointments for which eye protection is typically used by HCP.

Use eye protection devices beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life during patient care activities.

If there is no date available on the eye protection device label or packaging, facilities should contact the manufacturer. The user should visually inspect the product prior to use and, if there are concerns (such as degraded materials), discard the product.

Prioritize eye protection for selected activities such as:

- During care activities where splashes and sprays are anticipated, which typically includes aerosol generating procedures.
- During activities where prolonged face-to-face or close contact with a potentially infectious patient is unavoidable.

Consider using safety glasses (e.g., trauma glasses) that have extensions to cover the side of the eyes.

Exclude HCP at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19 from contact with known or suspected COVID-19 patients.

- During severe resource limitations, consider excluding HCP who may be at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19, such as those of older age, those with chronic medical conditions, or those who may be pregnant, from caring for patients with confirmed or suspected COVID-19 infection.

Designate convalescent HCP for provision of care to known or suspected COVID-19 patients.

- It may be possible to designate HCP who have clinically recovered from COVID-19 to preferentially provide care for additional patients with COVID-19. Individuals who have recovered from COVID-19 infection may have developed some protective immunity, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Selected Options for Reprocessing Eye Protection

Adhere to recommended manufacturer instructions for cleaning and disinfection.
When manufacturer instructions for cleaning and disinfection are unavailable, such as for single use disposable face shields, consider:

1. While wearing gloves, carefully wipe the *inside, followed by the outside* of the face shield or goggles using a clean cloth saturated with neutral detergent solution or cleaner wipe.
2. Carefully wipe the *outside* of the face shield or goggles using a wipe or clean cloth saturated with EPA-registered hospital disinfectant solution.
3. Wipe the outside of face shield or goggles with clean water or alcohol to remove residue.
4. Fully dry (air dry or use clean absorbent towels).
5. Remove gloves and perform hand hygiene.

**Additional Resources**

- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Isolation Gowns
- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Facemasks
- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Facemasks

**Audience:** These considerations are intended for use by federal, state, and local public health officials; leaders in occupational health services and infection prevention and control programs; and other leaders in healthcare settings who are responsible for developing and implementing policies and procedures for preventing pathogen transmission in healthcare settings.

**Purpose:** This document offers a series of strategies or options to optimize supplies of facemasks in healthcare settings when there is limited supply. It does not address other aspects of pandemic planning; for those, healthcare facilities can refer to COVID-19 preparedness plans.

Surge capacity refers to the ability to manage a sudden, unexpected increase in patient volume that would otherwise severely challenge or exceed the present capacity of a facility. While there are no commonly accepted measurements or triggers to distinguish surge capacity from daily patient care capacity, surge capacity is a useful framework to approach a decreased supply of facemasks during the COVID-19 response. Three general strata have been used to describe surge capacity and can be used to prioritize measures to conserve facemask supplies along the continuum of care.

- **Conventional capacity:** measures consist of providing patient care without any change in daily contemporary practices. This set of measures, consisting of engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment (PPE) controls should already be implemented in general infection prevention and control plans in healthcare settings.

- **Contingency capacity:** measures may change daily standard practices but may not have any significant impact on the care delivered to the patient or the safety of healthcare personnel (HCP). These practices may be used temporarily during periods of expected facemask shortages.

- **Crisis capacity:** strategies that are not commensurate with U.S. standards of care. These measures, or a combination of these measures, may need to be considered during periods of known facemask shortages.

The following contingency and crisis strategies are based upon these assumptions:

1. Facilities understand their facemask inventory and supply chain
2. Facilities understand their facemask utilization rate
3. Facilities are in communication with local healthcare coalitions, federal, state, and local public health partners (e.g., public health emergency preparedness and response staff) regarding identification of additional supplies.
4. Facilities have already implemented other engineering and administrative control measures including:
   - Reducing the number of patients going to the hospital or outpatient settings
   - Excluding HCP not essential for patient care from entering their care area
   - Reducing face-to-face HCP encounters with patients
   - Excluding visitors to patients with confirmed or suspected COVID-19
   - Cohorting patients and HCP
   - Maximizing use of telemedicine
5. Facilities have provided HCP with required education and training, including having them demonstrate competency with donning and doffing, with any PPE ensemble that is used to perform job responsibilities, such as provision of patient care

**Conventional Capacity Strategies**

**Use facemasks according to product labeling and local, state, and federal requirements.**

- FDA-cleared surgical masks are designed to protect against splashes and sprays and are prioritized for use when such exposures are anticipated, including surgical procedures.
• Facemasks that are not regulated by FDA, such as some procedure masks, which are typically used for isolation purposes, may not provide protection against splashes and sprays.

**Contingency Capacity Strategies**

Selectively cancel elective and non-urgent procedures and appointments for which a facemask is typically used by HCP.

Remove facemasks for visitors in public areas.

Healthcare facilities can consider removing all facemasks from public areas. Facemasks can be available to provide to symptomatic patients upon check in at entry points. All facemasks should be placed in a secure and monitored site. This is especially important in high-traffic areas like emergency departments.

Implement extended use of facemasks.

Extended use of facemasks is the practice of wearing the same facemask for repeated close contact encounters with several different patients, without removing the facemask between patient encounters.

- The facemask should be removed and discarded if soiled, damaged, or hard to breathe through.
- HCP must take care not to touch their facemask. If they touch or adjust their facemask they must immediately perform hand hygiene.
- HCP should leave the patient care area if they need to remove the facemask.

Restrict facemasks to use by HCP, rather than patients for source control.

Have patients with symptoms of respiratory infection use tissues or other barriers to cover their mouth and nose.

**Crisis Capacity Strategies**

Cancel all elective and non-urgent procedures and appointments for which a facemask is typically used by HCP.

Use facemasks beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life during patient care activities.

If there is no date available on the facemask label or packaging, facilities should contact the manufacturer. The user should visually inspect the product prior to use and, if there are concerns (such as degraded materials or visible tears), discard the product.

Implement limited re-use of facemasks.

Limited re-use of facemasks is the practice of using the same facemask by one HCP for multiple encounters with different patients but removing it after each encounter. As it is unknown what the potential contribution of contact transmission is for SARS-CoV-2, care should be taken to ensure that HCP do not touch outer surfaces of the mask during care, and that mask removal and replacement be done in a careful and deliberate manner.

- The facemask should be removed and discarded if soiled, damaged, or hard to breathe through.
- Not all facemasks can be re-used.
  - Facemasks that fasten to the provider via ties may not be able to be undone without tearing and should be considered only for extended use, rather than re-use.
  - Facemasks with elastic ear hooks may be more suitable for re-use.
- HCP should leave patient care area if they need to remove the facemask. Facemasks should be carefully folded so that the outer surface is held inward and against itself to reduce contact with the outer surface during storage. The folded mask can be stored between uses in a clean sealable paper bag or breathable container.

Prioritize facemasks for selected activities such as:

- For provision of essential surgeries and procedures
• During care activities where splashes and sprays are anticipated
• During activities where prolonged face-to-face or close contact with a potentially infectious patient is unavoidable
• For performing aerosol generating procedures, if respirators are no longer available

When No Facemasks Are Available, Options Include

Exclude HCP at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19 from contact with known or suspected COVID-19 patients. During severe resource limitations, consider excluding HCP who may be at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19, such as those of older age, those with chronic medical conditions, or those who may be pregnant, from caring for patients with confirmed or suspected COVID-19 infection.

Designate convalescent HCP for provision of care to known or suspected COVID-19 patients. It may be possible to designate HCP who have clinically recovered from COVID-19 to preferentially provide care for additional patients with COVID-19. Individuals who have recovered from COVID-19 infection may have developed some protective immunity, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Use a face shield that covers the entire front (that extends to the chin or below) and sides of the face with no facemask.

Consider use of expedient patient isolation rooms for risk reduction. Portable fan devices with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration that are carefully placed can increase the effective air changes per hour of clean air to the patient room, reducing risk to individuals entering the room without respiratory protection. NIOSH has developed guidance for using portable HEPA filtration systems to create expedient patient isolation rooms. The expedient patient isolation room approach involves establishing a high-ventilation-rate, negative pressure, inner isolation zone that sits within a “clean” larger ventilated zone.

Consider use of ventilated headboards. NIOSH has developed the ventilated headboard that draws exhaled air from a patient in bed into a HEPA filter, decreasing risk of HCP exposure to patient-generated aerosol. This technology consists of lightweight, sturdy, and adjustable aluminum framing with a retractable plastic canopy. The ventilated headboard can be deployed in combination with HEPA fan/filter units to provide surge isolation capacity within a variety of environments, from traditional patient rooms to triage stations, and emergency medical shelters.

HCP use of homemade masks: In settings where facemasks are not available, HCP might use homemade masks (e.g., bandana, scarf) for care of patients with COVID-19 as a last resort. However, homemade masks are not considered PPE, since their capability to protect HCP is unknown. Caution should be exercised when considering this option. Homemade masks should ideally be used in combination with a face shield that covers the entire front (that extends to the chin or below) and sides of the face.

Additional Resources

- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Eye Protection
- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Isolation Gowns
- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators

Page last reviewed: March 17, 2020
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)

Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Isolation Gowns

**Audience:** These considerations are intended for use by federal, state, and local public health officials; leaders in occupational health services and infection prevention and control programs; and other leaders in healthcare settings who are responsible for developing and implementing policies and procedures for preventing pathogen transmission in healthcare settings.

**Purpose:** This document offers a series of strategies or options to optimize supplies of isolation gowns in healthcare settings when there is limited supply. It does not address other aspects of pandemic planning; for those, healthcare facilities can refer to COVID-19 preparedness plans.

Surge capacity refers to the ability to manage a sudden, unexpected increase in patient volume that would otherwise severely challenge or exceed the present capacity of a facility. While there are no widely accepted measurements or triggers to distinguish surge capacity from daily patient care capacity, surge capacity is a useful framework to approach a decreased supply of isolation gowns during the COVID-19 response. Three general strata have been used to describe surge capacity and can be used to prioritize measures to conserve isolation gown supplies along the continuum of care.

- **Conventional capacity:** measures consist of providing patient care without any change in daily contemporary practices. This set of measures, consisting of engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment (PPE) controls should already be implemented in general infection prevention and control plans in healthcare settings.
- **Contingency capacity:** measures may change daily standard practices but may not have any significant impact on the care delivered to the patient or the safety of healthcare personnel (HCP). These practices may be used temporarily during periods of expected isolation gown shortages.
- **Crisis capacity:** strategies that are not commensurate with standard U.S. standards of care. These measures, or a combination of these measures, may need to be considered during periods of known isolation gown shortages.

The following contingency and crisis strategies are based upon these assumptions:

1. Facilities understand their current isolation gown inventory and supply chain
2. Facilities understand their isolation gown utilization rate
3. Facilities are in communication with local healthcare coalitions, federal, state, and local public health partners (e.g., public health emergency preparedness and response staff) regarding identification of additional supplies
4. Facilities have already implemented other engineering and administrative control measures including:
   - Reducing the number of patients going to the hospital or outpatient settings
   - Excluding HCP not directly involved in patient care
   - Reducing face-to-face HCP encounters with patients
   - Excluding visitors to patients with confirmed or suspected COVID-19
   - Cohorting patients and HCP
   - Maximizing use of telemedicine
5. Facilities have provided HCP with required education and training, including having them demonstrate competency with donning and doffing, with any PPE ensemble that is used to perform job responsibilities, such as provision of patient care

**Conventional Capacity Strategies**

*Use isolation gown alternatives that offer equivalent or higher protection.*

Several fluid-resistant and impermeable protective clothing options are available in the marketplace for HCP. These include isolation gowns and surgical gowns. When selecting the most appropriate protective clothing, employers should consider all of the available information on recommended protective clothing, including the potential limitations. Nonsterile, disposable
patient isolation gowns, which are used for routine patient care in healthcare settings, are appropriate for use by HCP when caring for patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19. In times of gown shortages, surgical gowns should be prioritized for surgical and other sterile procedures. Current U.S. guidelines do not require use of gowns that conform to any standards.

Contingency Capacity Strategies

Selectively cancel elective and non-urgent procedures and appointments for which a gown is typically used by HCP.

Shift gown use towards cloth isolation gowns.

Reusable (i.e., washable) gowns are typically made of polyester or polyester-cotton fabrics. Gowns made of these fabrics can be safely laundered according to routine procedures and reused. Care should be taken to ensure that HCP do not touch outer surfaces of the gown during care.

- Laundry operations and personnel may need to be augmented to facilitate additional washing loads and cycles
- Systems are established to routinely inspect, maintain (e.g., mend a small hole in a gown, replace missing fastening ties), and replace reusable gowns when needed (e.g., when they are thin or ripped)

Consider the use of coveralls.

Coveralls typically provide 360-degree protection because they are designed to cover the whole body, including the back and lower legs, and sometimes the head and feet as well. While the material and seam barrier properties are essential for defining the protective level, the coverage provided by the material used in the garment design, as well as certain features including closures, will greatly affect the protective level. HCP unfamiliar with the use of coveralls must be trained and practiced in their use, prior to using during patient care.

In the United States, the NFPA 1999 standard specifies the minimum design, performance, testing, documentation, and certification requirements for new single-use and new multiple-use emergency medical operations protective clothing, including coveralls for HCP.

Use of expired gowns beyond the manufacturer-designated shelf life for training.

The majority of isolation gowns do not have a manufacturer-designated shelf life. However, consideration can be made to using gowns that do and are past their manufacturer-designated shelf life. If there is no date available on the gown label or packaging, facilities should contact the manufacturer.

Use gowns or coveralls conforming to international standards.

Current guidelines do not require use of gowns that conform to any standards. In times of shortages, healthcare facilities can consider using international gowns and coveralls. Gowns and coveralls that conform to international standards, including with EN 13795 and EN14126, could be reserved for activities that may involve moderate to high amounts of body fluids.

Crisis Capacity Strategies

Cancel all elective and non-urgent procedures and appointments for which a gown is typically used by HCP.

Extended use of isolation gowns.

Consideration can be made to extend the use of isolation gowns (disposable or cloth) such that the same gown is worn by the same HCP when interacting with more than one patient known to be infected with the same infectious disease when these patients housed in the same location (i.e., COVID-19 patients residing in an isolation cohort). This can be considered only if there are no additional co-infectious diagnoses transmitted by contact (such as *Clostridioides difficile*) among patients. If the gown becomes visibly soiled, it must be removed and discarded as per usual practices.

Re-use of cloth isolation gowns.

Disposable gowns are not typically amenable to being doffed and re-used because the ties and fasteners typically break during doffing. Cloth isolation gowns could potentially be used and reused and could be considered for reuse without
Cloth isolation gowns could potentially be untied and retied and could be considered for re-use without laundering in between.

In a situation where the gown is being used as part of standard precautions to protect HCP from a splash, the risk of re-using a non-visibly soiled cloth isolation gown may be lower. However, for care of patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19, HCP risk from re-use of cloth isolation gowns without laundering among (1) single HCP caring for multiple patients using one gown or (2) among multiple HCP sharing one gown is unclear. The goal of this strategy is to minimize exposures to HCP and not necessarily prevent transmission between patients. Any gown that becomes visibly soiled during patient care should be disposed of and cleaned.

**Prioritize gowns.**

Gowns should be prioritized for the following activities:

- During care activities where splashes and sprays are anticipated, which typically includes aerosol generating procedures
- During the following high-contact patient care activities that provide opportunities for transfer of pathogens to the hands and clothing of healthcare providers, such as:
  - Dressing, bathing/showering, transferring, providing hygiene, changing linens, changing briefs or assisting with toileting, device care or use, wound care

Surgical gowns should be prioritized for surgical and other sterile procedures. Facilities may consider suspending use of gowns for endemic multidrug resistant organisms (e.g., MRSA, VRE, ESBL-producing organisms).

**When No Gowns Are Available**

**Consider using gown alternatives that have not been evaluated as effective.**

In situation of severely limited or no available isolation gowns, the following pieces of clothing can be considered as a last resort for care of COVID-19 patients as single use. However, none of these options can be considered PPE, since their capability to protect HCP is unknown. Preferable features include long sleeves and closures (snaps, buttons) that can be fastened and secured.

- Disposable laboratory coats
- Reusable (washable) patient gowns
- Reusable (washable) laboratory coats
- Disposable aprons
- Combinations of clothing: Combinations of pieces of clothing can be considered for activities that may involve body fluids and when there are no gowns available:
  - Long sleeve aprons in combination with long sleeve patient gowns or laboratory coats
  - Open back gowns with long sleeve patient gowns or laboratory coats
  - Sleeve covers in combination with aprons and long sleeve patient gowns or laboratory coats

Reusable patient gowns and lab coats can be safely laundered according to routine procedures.

- Laundry operations and personnel may need to be augmented to facilitate additional washing loads and cycles
- Systems are established to routinely inspect, maintain (e.g., mend a small hole in a gown, replace missing fastening ties) and replace reusable gowns when needed (e.g., when they are thin or ripped)

**Additional Resources**

- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Eye Protection
- Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Facemasks